



# March 21, 2024

# Loop DoS: Datagram Application-Layer Denial of Service Attacks

On March 19, 2024, the research group of Prof. Dr. Christian Rossow at CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security in Germany <u>disclosed</u> a new attack vector that exploits a common vulnerability in application-layer services based on the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). The vulnerability in several implementations of UDP application protocols is tracked through <u>CVE-2024-2169</u>.

# **Attack Vector**

Attackers could potentially craft a payload that triggers an error condition in a vulnerable server resulting in a reply with a failure datagram. The server failure datagram, when received by another vulnerable server, will result in a subsequent server failure datagram to the first vulnerable server. When both vulnerable systems keep sending error messages to each other indefinitely, the loop condition becomes perpetual. Since datagrams are regenerated for every response, the IP Time-to-Live (TTL) hop count limiter does not alter the indefinite nature of the loop condition.

To initiate a loop on a target system, an attacker needs to identify at least one other vulnerable system that runs the same service and can reach the targeted service. By spoofing the source IP of the initial request, an attacker can trick its victim into responding to another vulnerable server. The attack can be amplified by creating multiple loops between two vulnerable systems and by adding more (other) vulnerable systems and establishing enough perpetual loops to overload the victim.

# **Affected Services**

The vulnerability was identified in several hundreds of thousands of publicly exposed servers running vulnerable implementations of DNS, TFTP, NTP, Echo, Chargen or QOTD. The researchers focused on those applications that are most widely deployed. The vulnerabilities in NTP can likely be attributed to systems that use a version of ntpd that predates 2010. The legacy protocols Echo, Chargen, QOTD, Time, Daytime and Active Users were discovered to be vulnerable by design. TFTP and DNS are still under research and require more input from operators of vulnerable systems to discover the exact nature of the vulnerability.





### **Reasons for Concern**

Because of its stateless character, UDP allows legitimate services to be abused for volumetric amplification <u>DDoS attacks</u> and now also loop DoS attacks. The researchers estimated that 300,000 internet hosts are vulnerable to loop DoS.

The loops consist of single packet datagrams and generate a flood to the victim that originates from the same IP and UDP port. Per IP packet rate detectors should be able to detect such loop conditions. Depending on the actual number of vulnerable systems, the attack could be distributed across multiple servers resulting in an attack that is harder to detect based on per IP packet rates. The estimated number of vulnerable hosts per service exposed on the internet, as provided by the researchers, provides a good measure for the risk of distributed loop attacks associated with a specific service (see Table 1).

Service	Estimated vulnerable hosts
NTP	89k
DNS	63k
Echo (RFC862)	56k
TFTP	23k
Chargen (RFC864)	22k
QOTD (RFC865)	21k

Table 1: Estimated number of vulnerable hosts on the internet (per service)

#### **Detecting Vulnerable Systems**

The researchers at CISPA <u>published</u> a tool to scan and discover systems that are vulnerable to the attack payloads they have been able to identify. Attack payloads for DNS, TFTP and NTP are defined in the '<u>simple\_verify.py</u>' Python script.

#### **Recommendations**

If possible, avoid exposing services based on UDP and more specifically any of the services listed in Table 1. When there is a need to expose one of those services, ensure it is kept up to date with the latest security patches and protected by adequate solutions to prevent abuse and detect anomalous behavior.





The researchers at CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security in Germany are updating their <u>advisory</u> as more information becomes available.

# Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

- CVE-2024-2169
- Hex versions of DNS, TFTP and NTP payloads that can trigger the loop condition are provided in the file '<u>simple\_verify.py</u>' on the CISPA GitHub.





# **EFFECTIVE DDOS PROTECTION ESSENTIALS**

- Hybrid DDoS Protection Use on-premise and <u>cloud DDoS protection</u> for real-time <u>DDoS attack prevention</u> that also addresses high-volume attacks and protects from pipe saturation
- **Behavioral-Based Detection** Quickly and accurately identify and block anomalies while allowing legitimate traffic through
- Real-Time Signature Creation Promptly protect against unknown threats and zero-day attacks
- A Cybersecurity Emergency Response Plan Turn to a dedicated emergency team of experts who have experience with Internet of Things security and handling IoT outbreaks
- Intelligence on Active Threat Actors High fidelity, correlated and analyzed data for preemptive protection against currently active known attackers

For further **<u>network and application protection</u>** measures, Radware urges companies to inspect and patch their network to defend against risks and threats.

#### EFFECTIVE WEB APPLICATION SECURITY ESSENTIALS

- Full OWASP Top-10 coverage against defacements, injections, etc.
- Low false positive rate using negative and positive security models for maximum accuracy
- Auto-policy generation capabilities for the widest coverage with the lowest operational effort
- Bot protection and device fingerprinting capabilities to overcome dynamic IP attacks and achieve improved bot detection and blocking
- **Securing APIs** by filtering paths, understanding XML and JSON schemas for enforcement, and using activity tracking mechanisms to trace bots and guard internal resources
- Flexible deployment options including on-premises, out-of-path, virtual or cloud-based

#### LEARN MORE AT RADWARE'S SECURITY RESEARCH CENTER

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